[...] “I don’t agree with the President’s view that we don’t talk to bad people,” Clinton said, “because clearly that’s not a smart way to figure out how you can bring leverage on them and that’s what I’m interested in.” Clinton is right. Leverage over Syria can only come from giving the regime an opportunity to demonstrate it is willing to become part of the solution rather than remain part of the problem. The Bush administration’s approach of isolating Syria has only made the situation worse because it contains no incentives for Syria to change its behavior. [...]

Then perhaps we should be prepared to offer Iran the concession we have previously withheld: a security guarantee–an assurance that we will not seek regime change. Hopefully this is a concession which costs us little, because hopefully we are not contemplating military action against Iran. But a security guarantee would be worth a lot to Iran, and we should only give it in exchange for substantial concessions from them. Though we have not threatened to use force, we have–particularly in the debate over its nuclear program–maintained it as an implicit threat: the threat of a threat. Removing that threat would take away a substantial stick with which to push Iran towards nuclear compliance and away from sponsoring Hizbullah. But those are issues in which other countries have a stake as well. Of all of Iran’s undesirable activities, its meddling in Iraq is the one that most directly and adversely affects the United States. If giving Iran a security guarantee will improve its cooperation in Iraq, then it may be a trade worth making.

Taking this section in parts:

Incentive i. – At the moment, disorder in Iraq hurts American interests more than those of Syria or Iran. Though Iraq’s disintegration is undesirable to its neighbors, the civil war and insurgency could go on for some time before the country comes apart completely. Syria and Iran might believe that they can stoke the violence and keep it at a controlled burn to cause the U.S. maximum discomfort.

Incentive ii. – Can we credibly threaten to leave Afghanistan to the Taliban? We have to stay there out of our own interests.

Incentives iii.-vi. – Why have these incentives not been successful in convincing Iran to move on other issues, like its nuclear program?

The idea conveyed here that Iran’s nuclear program can be kept as a separate issue, apart from negotiations regarding Iraq (and, probably, Lebanon and Israel) is purposefully naive. Negotiations with Iran are necessary but, thanks to the Bush administration’s reckless blundering in Iraq, we start from a position of weakness and will have to give up something. Either Iran will retain its nukes, or its influence in Iraq and elsewhere.

This is a remarkable observation which should have been entertained as part of a scenario for a quick withdrawal. The ISG admits that “Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for Iranian national security interests.” But the Report does not recommend to drive this point seriously with Iran to make it clear that the US does have the option for a quick withdrawal which would leave Tehran to inherit its own ill-intentioned investments in Iraq. This should be part of the necessary “conversation” with Iran rather than the exclusive focus on “incentives,” rewards and engagement without any preconditions.

If a diplomatic dialogue with Iran and Syria is to be useful, it must be comprehensive and it must be in fact WITH conditions such as those spelled out in recommendation 15 related to Syria. Engagement with Iran must be preconditioned to halting its blatant interference in Lebanon and Palestinian affairs. The Report is eager to offer incentives to Iran and Syria almost at any price . It should have spent more time understanding the Iranian regional agenda and aspirations in order to make productive policy recommendations. Paragraph 6 of this section proves that Iran continues to benefit from the US invasion, occupation,and continued American military presence in Iraq. If there are no preconditions for the diplomatic dialogue, Iran would have been rewarded twice: Once when the US invaded Iraq and the second time for the price of American withdrawal from Iraq.